Russia and the West. By Karl-Georg Wellmann (EU)
There are two constants in European politics.
First: Russia is part of Europe, in geographic, cultural and historical terms. That is not something which can be taken for granted, as is repeatedly demonstrated by comments by Russian politicians, among others.
Sergey Lavrov recently said that Europe is always Russia’s first choice. This implies that Russia would also have the choice of turning away from Europe and becoming an Asian country. It would be unthinkable for a Polish, French or German politician to describe Europe as being their country’s first choice. We are all part of Europe, and thus have no choice.
Second: security in Europe cannot be achieved in opposition to Russia; what was true in Bismarck’s time remains true today. The Cold War era was no different. There was the ‘balance of terror’ and the hope for rational leaders, and there may even have been a certain degree of stability, but there was no security.
In the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union, no new system of collective security has emerged. NATO has changed its role in view of the new threats. The major new task is to deal with challenges to cooperative security in and affecting Europe, and which thus also affect Russia’s security, as we are working together to do with regard to Afghanistan, for example. There is no basis in reality for concerns about an aggressive, expanding Western military alliance; the military infrastructure that would be required does not exist.
If the leadership of a Caucasus republic can spark an international crisis, as in August 2008, then the international conflict-management mechanisms have obviously not worked. It is equally obvious that the costs of the way in which this crisis was resolved outweighed the benefits for Russia. And the disputes about the status of Ukraine or Moldova do not testify to the good functioning of international mechanisms either.
The Russian president is proposing negotiations on a new security architecture stretching from “Vancouver to Vladivostok”. A discussion must take place on whether there is a need for such a security architecture or whether existing institutions and structures could be strengthened. And because this discussion must necessarily involve the North Americans and the Russians, the geographical description of the area involved is indeed accurate.
The extremely successful path towards peace, freedom and prosperity taken by Western Europe and in particular Germany in the wake of the catastrophe of two world wars is inextricably linked to our friendship with the United States. As this is an essential element of our raison d’état, it would be wise for Russian foreign policy to leave no doubt that it recognises this. The same applies for our involvement in NATO, which was the guarantor of our peace and freedom in the Cold War.
Sceptics allege that the Russian proposals are merely a tactic to weaken Euro-Atlantic relations and NATO, to establish a right for Russia to have a say in all NATO matters, and to achieve a position of supremacy with regard to the states of the former Soviet Union. Such views show that there is too little trust.
Yet in the 21st century, trust is the essential requirement for international cooperation and integration. This is underestimated by the Russian political elite. Due to their widely varying historical experiences, the states of Europe have very different – but in each case fully legitimate – perceptions of recent history. If the Russian government states that the use of military force is acceptable in order to protect Russians living abroad – whose numbers are constantly rising due to a generous approach to the issuing of Russian passports – it is not just the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians who feel alarmed; the Germans do too, even though Germany’s relations with Russia are significantly better. Russia reacted aggressively to the relocation of a war memorial in Tallinn. While the internet in Estonia was paralysed by a cyber-attack, the youth organisation Nashi picketed the Estonian embassy in Moscow. I most certainly call for a fitting remembrance of the countless Russian war dead. But unlike most of the Russians I have spoken to, I have seen the new location for the memorial – a park-like, well-maintained cemetery, more appropriate for remembrance of the war dead than the former location at a major traffic junction. In this case, the Russian protests were just as excessive as the claim that fascist forces were setting the tone in Estonia again.
There are no separate German, French or Italian policies towards Russia, only a European one. If Russia underestimates the importance of confidence-building vis-à-vis the small EU Member States, this makes it more difficult to arrive at the necessary European consensus and harms Russian interests in forging close ties with the EU.
Each state should analyse and come to terms with its own past. The Germans are doing so regarding the crimes of the Nazi period, and take responsibility for what happened, going beyond individual guilt. This was the prerequisite for Germany to regain its neighbours’ trust in its democratic development and to become part of the European success story after 1945.
The Red Army is part of the European story of freedom, in that it defeated fascism together with the Western Allies and suffered the highest death toll. It was Russian soldiers who liberated Auschwitz. At the same time, however, the states of Central and Eastern Europe also experienced the end of the war as the start of decades of repression. For this reason, Russian regret about the demise of the Soviet Union cannot inspire confidence among the states of Europe.
Sergey Lavrov has spoken of common European values and the “unity of European civilization”. That is encouraging and should allow an unbiased discussion among politicians and historians about the history of the 20th century. If there should then be fundamental differences in the evaluation of the major dictatorships and their crimes, there would indeed still be a long path ahead of us in the creation of a new security architecture.
President Medvedev’s aims for his proposals go further than simply the establishment of a new security framework. A discussion of them would be worthwhile. The financial crisis, in particular, highlights the need for international cooperation. And the modernisation partnership with the West remains a major task, one which Russia in particular has a significant interest in expanding and implementing.
Karl-Georg Wellmann (MP)
Germany,Bundestag
20.01.09