Establish the Common, Overcome the Divergence: Towards the Union of Russia and the EU. By Yury Yurgens (Rus)

Last year, in advance of the November Russia-EU summit, a series of research projects were carried out under the auspices of the Institute of Modern Development Foundation regarding different aspects of our relations with the European Union.
A summary review of this research “Towards the Union of Europe" was published by The Rossiyskaya Gazeta. In that review we tried to give an overview of the current situation in the relations between Russia and the European Union, define the strategic aims and the prospective agenda in this sphere (see I.Yurgens, S.Karaganov. Towards the Union of Europe. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Novemter 6, 2008, No. 4786; http://www.rg.ru/2008/11/06/russia-europe.html).
The main idea that we tried to bring home to the readers was that today both sides more than ever need a new philosophy of this relationship, which would lay the ground not only for the expansion of cooperation, but also for a new strategic union based on equality and global responsibility. Only this union can prevent relative marginalization of both the EU and Russia, given the foreseen reduction of their share in the world’s GDP, stimulate their development and ensure sustainability in the face of future challenges and threats.
Since that publication, the topic of the Russia-EU relations has always been in the centre of our attention, and we must say that the ‘today’ we were speaking about in the previous paragraph is still not over on the global political calendar. The Russia-EU relationship is still marked by mutual miscomprehension. Problems tend to be aggravated more often than they are resolved. However, the ground for the strategic union is becoming more and more solid due to the course of historic development itself.
The present-day stage of our relations is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty and inertial development, while the external environment is developing increasingly fast. The lack of a common strategic vision fuels controversy and inevitably brings it to the forefront. This also explains the politization of energy sphere, the protraction of Russia's accession to the WTO not unassisted by the EU, and excessive dependence of the Russia-EU partnership on the state of relations between Russia and the USA.
The present day European vision of the situation was quite clearly formulated by Thomas Gomart, director of the Russia/CIS Center of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) during the Russia-EU business dialogue at Saint-Petersburg Economic Forum: “Russia is the EU’s third most important partner, but the most difficult one in the political sense".
While not denying the complexity Mr Gomart was referring to, it should be noted that the European Union itself from year to year is becoming a more and more difficult partner not only for Russia but also for the United States and Asian countries. The slow progress of European integration, the noticeable weakening of the real potential of collective institutions and the strengthening of national authorities in Europe make absurd the accusations that can often be heard concerning Russia’s attempts to ‘divide and rule’, to deal with European states on a bilateral basis and to set them to fight with each other. It is impossible to divide something which is already divided, it is impossible to tackle problems by working with those who have neither power nor authority for that.
However, this rather cheerless clinical picture does mean that, provided both sides have enough common sense and political will, a strategic union of Russia and Europe may not be in the offing. Our interests objectively coincide on most points of today’s international political agenda. We want to prevent a new militarization of international relations, to keep up the universal value of the world law and institutions, to maintain stability in the Greater Middle East and other key regions, and to raise the competitiveness of European and Russian economies amid global competition, etc. At present, we need to make active joint efforts in order to define and conceptualize the common interests of Russia and the European Union and to work out long-term rapprochement plans adequate to the global reality. It is these plans that should lay the ground for the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the whole of the future international treaty framework which was the subject of talk during the Khabarovsk summit in May this year.
What is required from the organizers and participants of this process is their commitment to the result and pragmatism, but this should be a healthy pragmatism. Over the last two decades, mostly for objective reasons, the concept of pragmatism has acquired a distorted and confrontational sense in international relations as an art of making 'win-lose’ deals.
A recent example of such ‘pragmatic’ policy is the official refusal of the Russian Government to observe the norms of the unfavourable for us Energy Charter Treaty. This treaty obviously needs reviewing and amending, and we may even hope that this demarche will stimulate this somewhat. But this act will first and foremost be regarded as Russia's refusal to guarantee foreign investment on its territory and to guarantee Russian investments in Energy Charter Treaty member states. This is not only a step back from the Russia-European integration; this is a serious obstacle for the development of Russian economy.
A similar approach is frequently seen in the actions of the other party. It can be observed in the 'energy security' sphere, in restricting the access for Russian businesses to European markets in other spheres, and in the previously mentioned problems with Russia’s accession to the WTO.
If we manage to finally eliminate such attitude, if the realization that it is only win-win solutions that can lay the basis for a productive cooperation, then a union between Russia and the EU may develop from a beautiful idea into a real basis for accelerated development and leadership of both sides in the XXI century.